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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the optimal investment policy of the ﬁrm which is ﬁnanced
by issuing equity, straight debt and convertible debt. We extend the model in Mauer and
Sarkar [7] over ﬁnancing with convertible debt. We examine two diﬀerent investment policies
that maximize the equity value and the ﬁrm value and show the agency cost as the diﬀerence
between each policy value. Furthermore, we investigate how the issuance of convertible debt
aﬀects investment.
Keywords: Real options, convertible debt, investment, agency cost
1 Introduction
Real options theory, pioneered by Brennan and Schwartz [2], and McDonald and Siegel [9], and
summarized in Dixit and Pindyck [3], has attracted growing attention because it enables us to
account for the value of ﬂexibility under uncertainty. In standard real options models, all-equity
ﬁnancing is assumed, and the interactions between investment and ﬁnancing decisions have been
not analyzed.
Recently many researchers have studied the interaction among ﬁrm’s investment and ﬁnanc-
ing decisions under uncertainty by means of real option framework. In some literatures, the
investment problems for the ﬁrm with growth options, which is ﬁnanced with equity and debt
are investigated (e.g. Lyandres and Zhdanov [4], Mauer and Ott [6], Mauer and Sarkar [7], and
1Sundaresan and Wang [10]). Although the debt used in these studies is straight debt, there also
exists a previous work on the eﬀect of convertible debt ﬁnancing on the investment decisions.
Lyandres and Zhdanov [5] suggests the model for analyzing the investment problem of the ﬁrm
with outstanding convertible debt and discusses the accelerated investment eﬀect arising from
the issuance of convertible debt by the optimal investment policy to maximize the equity value.
In their model, the value of the ﬁrm, which is the sum of the equity and debt values, and the
leverage ratio are not analyzed.
In this paper, we examine the optimal investment policy of the ﬁrm which is ﬁnanced by
issuing equity, straight debt and convertible debt. We extend the model in Mauer and Sarkar [7]
over ﬁnancing with convertible debt in the following section. As in Mauer and Sarkar [7], we
examines two diﬀerent investment policies that maximize the equity value and the ﬁrm value. In
Sec. 3 we discuss a diﬀerence of the optimal investment policies maximizing between the value
of equity and the ﬁrm value by issuing convertible debt, and then show the agency cost as the
diﬀerence between each policy value by using numerical results. Furthermore, we investigate
how the issuance of convertible debt aﬀects investment. Finally, in Sec. 4 we summarize this
paper with some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a ﬁrm with an option to invest at any time by paying a ﬁxed investment cost I. The
ﬁrm partially ﬁnances the cost of investment with straight debt and convertible debt. Denote
Ks as the total issue value of straight debt with the instantaneous contractual coupon payment
of s and inﬁnite maturity, and Kc as that of convertible debt with coupon payment of c and
inﬁnite maturity. These coupon payments are tax-deductible at a constant corporate tax rate τ.
Once the investment option is exercised, we assume that the ﬁrm can receive the instantaneous
proﬁt
π(xt) = (1 − τ)(xt − s − c), (1)
where xt is the ﬁrm’s instantaneous EBIT. Suppose that xt is given by a geometric Brownian
motion
dxt = µxtdt + σxtdWt, (2)
where µ and σ are the risk-adjusted expected growth rate and the volatility of xt, respectively,
and Wt is a standard Brownian motion deﬁned on a probability space (Ω,F,P). We assume
that the holders of convertible debt can convert the debt into a fraction η of the original equity,
where η = αc and α is a constant. In this paper we deal with only non-callable convertible debt.
In order to examine two diﬀerent investment policies which maximize the equity value and the
ﬁrm value and investigate how the issue of convertible debt inﬂuences investment, we consider
several settings. First, we present a benchmark model in which the investment is ﬁnanced with
2all-equity. Second, we examine the case in that the investment is ﬁnanced with equity and
straight debt, based on the analysis in Mauer and Sarkar [7]. Third, we model the investment
ﬁnanced with equity and convertible debt. Finally, we consider the ﬁrm with an option of
investment that is ﬁnanced with equity and both debt.
2.1 All-Equity Financing
In this section we assume that the investment is ﬁnanced entirely with equity (s = 0 and c = 0).
This case has been studied in the literature on real options (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck [3] and
McDonald and Siegel [9]).
The optimal investment rule is to exercise the investment option at the ﬁrst passage time of
the stochastic shock to an upper threshold x∗. Assuming that the pre-investment proﬁt of the








e−r(u−T∗)(1 − τ)xudu − I
}]
, (3)
where T∗ is a stopping time (investment time) when xt reaches the investment threshold x∗, Ex0
is the conditional expectation operator given that the EBIT at time 0 is equal to x0, and r is
the risk-free interest rate. For convergence, we assume r > µ.
Since the ordinary diﬀerential equation, which is satisﬁed by the value of investment option







− rF = 0 (4)
for x < x∗, the general solution of Eq. (4) is given by
F(x) = a1xβ1 + a2xβ2, x < x∗, (5)


















σ2 < 0. Using












( (x∗) − I), x0 < x∗, (7)






From β1 > 1 and r > µ, the investment threshold x∗ > I. This means that the investment is
made when the EBIT is higher than the investment cost.
1See, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck [3].
32.2 Equity and Straight Debt Financing
Next we consider a ﬁrm which has an option of the investment that is ﬁnanced with equity
and straight debt (s > 0 and c = 0), introduced in Mauer and Sarkar [7], and Sundaresan and
Wang [10].
2.2.1 Optimal Policies after Investment
In this section we model the values of equity and straight debt after the exercise of investment
option. Once the investment option has been exercised, the optimal default policy is established
from the issue of debt. The optimal default strategy of the equity holders maximizes the equity
value, selecting the default threshold xd. Letting the earnings xt at investment time t equal x,






e−r(u−t)(1 − τ)(xu − s)du
]
, (9)
where Td is the stopping time on reaching the default threshold xd. Using standard arguments
as in Sec. 2.1, the equity value E(x) is given by




















Let Ds(x) be the total value of straight debt issued at investment time t. Since the holders





e−r(u−t)sdu + e−r(Td−t)(1 − θ) (xTd)
]
, (12)
where θ is the proportional bankruptcy cost, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. The holders of straight debt are entitled
to the unlevered value of the ﬁrm net of proportional bankruptcy cost, (1−θ) (x) at bankruptcy.










− (1 − θ) (xd)
)
, x > xd. (13)
The sum of E(x) in Eq. (10) and Ds(x) in Eq. (13) gives the ﬁrm value as










− θ (xd). (14)
The ﬁrm value Vs(x) is decomposed into the value of unlevered ﬁrm  (x), the expected present
value of straight debt tax shields and the expected present value of bankruptcy cost.
42.2.2 Optimal Investment Policy
Here we consider the optimal investment policy. First, we examine the optimal policy maximizing
the value of equity, not total ﬁrm value. Denote x∗
2 as the second-best investment threshold. By
the optimal policy selecting x∗
2 to maximize the equity value (9), the value of the investment














2 is the stopping time on reaching the investment threshold x∗
2, and Ks is the total values
of straight debt issued at investment. Using the value matching and smooth-pasting conditions








2) − (I − Ks)} (16)
for x0 < x∗
2 and the investment threshold x∗









2) − (I − Ks) = 0, (17)













− (1 − θ) (xd)
)
. (18)
Noticing that Ks = Ds(x∗
2) in Eq. (18) and Vs(x∗
2) = E(x∗
2)+Ds(x∗









2) − I}. (19)
Next, we analyze the optimal investment policy maximizing the ﬁrm value. By choosing the
ﬁrst-best investment threshold x∗
1 and maximizing the ﬁrm value Vs(x) in Eq. (14), the value of














1 is the stopping time on reaching the threshold x∗
1. For x0 < x∗
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and the investment threshold x∗









1) − I = 0. (22)
52.3 Equity and Convertible Debt Financing
In this section we consider a ﬁrm which has an option of the investment that is ﬁnanced with
equity and convertible debt (s = 0 and c > 0). In this case the optimal problems of the equity
holders and the convertible debt holders have to be solved simultaneously. The optimal policy
of the equity holders maximizes the equity value selecting the default threshold. On the other
hand, the optimal policy of the convertible debt holders maximizes the value of convertible
debt selecting the conversion threshold. We follow Brennan and Schwartz [1] and assume block
conversion. This means that all convertible debt holders exercise the conversion option at the
same time.
2.3.1 Optimal Policies after Investment
We examine the values of equity and convertible debt issued at investment time. The equity
holders optimally select the default threshold xd, maximizing the equity value. The equity value















where Td is the stopping time on reaching the default threshold xd, Tc is the stopping time on
reaching the conversion threshold xc selected by the convertible debt holders, and 1{Tc<Td} is an
indicator function that is equal to one if Tc < Td and is equal to zero otherwise. By converting
the equity value is diluted, that is, 1
1+η is the dilution factor.
Let Dc(x) be the total value of convertible debt issued at investment time t. The holders of
convertible debt receive the continuous coupon payment of c and choose the optimal conversion
threshold xc, maximizing the value of convertible debt. Then, the total value of convertible debt















The holders of convertible debt are entitled to (1 − θ) (x) at bankruptcy.
Once the convertible debt has been converted, the ﬁrm becomes an all-equity entity. It
follows from the optimal problems of the equity holders and convertible debt holders in (23) and
(24), respectively, that the values of equity and convertible debt prior to default and conversion
are given by













6Constants ai, i = 3,··· ,6, the default threshold xd and the conversion threshold xc must be




































































Eqs. (27), (28) and (30) represent conditions in default. Eq. (27) is the value matching condition
which ensures that the value of equity at the default threshold is equal to zero. Eq. (28) is the
smooth-pasting condition that ensures the optimality of the the default threshold xd. Eq. (30)
is the value-matching condition which ensures that the value of convertible debt at default
threshold equals the unlevered value of the ﬁrm net of proportional bankruptcy cost. Eqs. (29),
(31) and (32) represent conditions in conversion. Eq. (29) is the value matching condition
requiring that the value of equity at the conversion threshold is equal to a proportion of the
unlevered value of the ﬁrm possessed by the original equity holders after conversion. Eq. (31) is
the value matching condition which ensures that the value of convertible debt at the conversion
threshold is equal to the value of new equity issued in conversion. Eq. (32) is the smooth-pasting
condition that ensures the optimality of the the conversion threshold xc. Six equations (27)–(32)
have six unknown variables (ai,i = 3,··· ,6,xd,xc). We can solve these equations numerically.
Then, the ﬁrm value Vc(x) is given by
Vc(x) = E(x) + Dc(x) =  (x) +
τc
r
+ (a3 + a5)xβ1 + (a4 + a6)xβ2. (33)
2.3.2 Optimal Investment Policy
We examine two optimal investment policies to maximize the equity value (23) and the ﬁrm








i) − I} (34)
for x0 < x∗
i and i = 1,2. The second-best investment threshold x∗










2) − (I − Dc(x∗
2)) = 0, (35)
and the ﬁrst-best investment threshold x∗









1) − I = 0. (36)
72.4 Equity, Straight Debt and Convertible Debt Financing
In this section we consider a ﬁrm with an option of the investment that is ﬁnanced with eq-
uity, straight debt and convertible debt (s > 0 and c > 0). For simplicity reasons, we as-
sume that straight debt and convertible debt have the same priority. Hence, the holders of
straight debt are entitled to s
s+c(1 − θ) (x) at pre-conversion bankruptcy and (1 − θ) (x) at
post-conversion bankruptcy. Similarly, the convertible debt holders are entitled to c
s+c(1−θ) (x)
at pre-conversion bankruptcy.
2.4.1 Optimal Policies after Investment
We now model the values of equity, straight debt and convertible debt after the investment
option has been exercised. The equity holders optimally select two default thresholds; the
pre-conversion default threshold xd and the post-conversion default threshold xd,c, maximizing
the equity value. The optimal post-conversion default threshold xd,c is not equal to the pre-
conversion default one xd, because debt decreases when convertible debt is converted into equity.












e−r(u−t)(1 − τ)(xu − s)du
]
, (37)
where Td and Td,c are the stopping times when xt reach the default thresholds xd and xd,c,
respectively, and Tc is the stopping time on reaching the conversion threshold xc.
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. (38)
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e−r(u−t)(1 − τ)(xu − s)du
]
. (39)
Once the convertible debt has been converted, the ﬁrm becomes an entity that issues equity
and straight debt and the optimal default policy is established as in Sec. 2.2.1. Let Ea(x) and
Ds,a(x) be the post-conversion total values of equity and straight debt. Letting xt at conversion
time t equal x, the post-conversion default threshold xd,c, the equity value Ea(x) and the value
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)
. (42)
Next, we consider the values prior to conversion. It follows from the optimal problems of
the equity holders, straight debt holders and convertible debt holders in (37), (38) and (39),
respectively, that the values of equity, straight debt and convertible debt prior to default and
conversion are given by

















Constants ai, i = 7,··· ,12, the pre-conversion default threshold xd and the conversion threshold























































































where Ea(x) and Ds,a(x) are given in Eqs. (41) and (42). Eqs. (46), (47), (49) and (51) are
conditions in default. On the other hand, Eqs. (48), (50), (52) and (53) are conditions in
conversion. Eq. (46) is the value matching condition which ensures that the equity value at
the default threshold equals zero. Eq. (47) is the smooth-pasting condition that ensures the
optimality of the default threshold xd. Eqs. (49) and (51) are the value matching conditions
which ensure that the values of debt are equal to respective fractions of the unlevered value of
the ﬁrm net of proportional bankruptcy cost. Eq. (48) is the value matching condition requiring
that the value of equity at the conversion threshold equals a proportion of the post-conversion
9value of equity given in Eq. (41). Eq. (50) is the value matching condition which ensures
that the pre-conversion value of straight debt equals the post-conversion value of straight debt.
Equation (52) is the value matching condition which ensures that the value of the convertible
debt at the conversion threshold is equal to a proportion of the post-conversion value of equity.
Eq. (53) is the smooth-pasting condition that ensures the optimality of the conversion threshold
xc. Eight equations (46)-(53) have eight unknown variables (ai,i = 7,··· ,12,xd,xc). These
equations can be solved numerically.
Then, the ﬁrm value Vs+c(x) is given by




2.4.2 Optimal Investment Policy
By the optimal investment policies to maximize the value of equity and the ﬁrm value, both the
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for x0 < x∗
i and i = 1,2. The second-best investment threshold x∗
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2)) = 0, (56)
and the ﬁrst-best investment threshold x∗









1) − I = 0. (57)
3 Numerical Analysis
3.1 Investment Option and Agency Cost
In this section, the calculation results of the value of equity, each debt, and the investment option
are presented in order to quantify the agency cost. We use the following base case parameters:
µ = 0.01, σ = 0.2, r = 0.05, I = 5, s = 0.15, c = 0.15, α = 1.5, θ = 0.3, τ = 0.3.
Fig. 1 shows the values of equity, straight debt and convertible debt as functions of the
earning x at issue time and the post-conversion values of equity and straight debt as functions
of the earning x at conversion time in the case of Sec. 2.4, that is, the investment is ﬁnanced with
equity, straight debt and convertible debt. As can be seen in this ﬁgure, the threshold values
for the pre-conversion default, the post-conversion default and the conversion are 0.140, 0.069
and 2.229, respectively. These values can provide the investment value of the ﬁrm ﬁnanced by
issuing equity, straight debt and convertible debt.
In Fig. 2, the investment values and the threshold values of the investment for the ﬁrm-
value-maximizing and the equity-value-maximizing policies are shown. It turns out that the
10threshold value of the equity-value-maximizing policy is smaller than that of the ﬁrm-value-
maximizing policy. Thus, like the model in Mauer and Sarkar [7], the equity-value-maximizing
policy overinvests compared to the ﬁrm-value-maximizing policy. Furthermore, at the current
value x0 of 0.3, the investment option values for the ﬁrm-value-maximizing and equity-value-
maximizing policies are 1.959 and 1.882, respectively. The diﬀerence between these values for
each policy, that is, the agency cost of overinvestment is 0.077. A proportion of the agency cost
to the equity-value-maximizing policy, which is the loss in ﬁrm value, is 4.1%. It seems that
the agency cost in this case is relatively large compared with that in the case of the ﬁrm which
has only straight debt as in Mauer and Sarkar [7]. In this section, we consider the case that
the investment is ﬁnanced with equity, straight debt and convertible debt. In order to compare
the property of convertible debt with that of straight debt, we explore the investment ﬁnanced
with equity and convertible debt (but no straight debt), and equity and straight debt (but no
convertible debt) in the next section.
3.2 Comparison of Convertible Debt and Straight Debt
Here we analyze the investment decision in which the ﬁrm issues convertible debt. In this section,
the following set of parameters is used: x0 = 0.3, µ = 0.01, σ = 0.2, r = 0.05, I = 5, α =
1.5, θ = 0.3, τ = 0.3.
Fig. 3 shows the ﬁrst-best and second-best investment thresholds as functions of coupon
payment, c or s, in the case that the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced with equity and either straight debt or
convertible debt in Sec.2.2 and 2.3. For the ﬁrst-best investment policy, convertible debt leads
to underinvestment relative to straight debt. Once the investment is ﬁnanced with debt, the
ﬁrm can enjoy interest tax shields, and so can have a tax incentive to accelerate the investment.
Since convertible debt includes the option to convert debt into equity, the presence of the op-
tion reduces the magnitude of the tax shield eﬀect. This leads to an incentive to speed down
investment. On the other hand, for the second-best investment policy, convertible debt leads
to overinvestment relative to straight debt. The equity holders are not aﬀected by the beneﬁt
of the debt holders, and are therefore indiﬀerent to increased risk of default resulting from the
earlier investment. As can be seen in Fig. 4, since the convertible debt includes the conversion
option, the default probability of convertible debt is higher than that of straight debt. This
means that the equity holders optimally hope to exercise the option prior to the convertible
debt holders. Similarly, the convertible debt holders also wish to exercise the option, optimally,
prior to the equity holders. Hence, by investing earlier, the equity holders can shift the default
risk to the debt holders, can raise the probability of conversion for the convertible debt holders,
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Figure 1: Equity, straight debt and convertible debt





















Figure 2: Investment option


















Figure 3: Investment threshold












Figure 4: Default threshold
µ = 0.01, σ = 0.2, r = 0.05, I = 5, α = 1.5, θ = 0.3, τ = 0.3
134 Summary
In this paper, we have investigated the optimal investment policy of the ﬁrm ﬁnanced by issuing
equity, straight debt and convertible debt. The values of equity, straight debt and convertible
debt after exercising the investment option were shown. We also showed the investment option
value and the threshold value for the ﬁrm-value-maximizing and equity-value-maximizing poli-
cies. In particular, we found that the issue of convertble debt for the ﬁrm-value-maximizing
policy leads to underinvestment relative to that of straight debt. On the other hand, the issue
of convertble debt for the equity-value-maximizing policy leads to overinvestmeCCCCnt relative
to that of straight debt.
Many convertible debt contracts include call provisions which entitle the ﬁrm to repurchase
its debt. For future works, therefore, we will examine the eﬀect of callable convertible debt on
investment decision as in Lyandres and Zhdanov [5]. In addition, as discussed in Mayers [8], con-
vertible debt provides a ﬁrm with sequential investments with an advantage. Possible extension
of this study also includes an analysis of multi-stage investment project.
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